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RIPARIAN AND PUBLIC RIGHTS TO
LAKES AND STREAMS
RALPH W. JOHNSON*

The competition for the available water supply in Washington,' as
elsewhere, 2 has intensified in recent years. In the early history of the
state, irrigation, particularly on the eastern side of the Cascade mountains, clearly dominated the water picture. Since then power, domestic
consumption, industry, recreation and other uses have become increasingly important and have steadily encroached on the preferred status
originally given irrigation.
In recent years this competition has resulted in the enactment of a
number of important statutes, directed at protecting various water
uses other than irrigation and making a reasonable apportionment of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington.
1 See REPORT OF STATE OF WASHINGTON TO UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COM-

ON NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES (1959). This report compiles and analyzes
reports from the various state departments that control some aspect of water use, including: Department of Game, Fisheries, Health, Agriculture, Commerce and Economic Development, Pollution Control Commission and Weather Modification Board.
2 THE PRESIDENT'S WATER RESOURCES POLICY COMMISSION, in 1951 published:
A WATER POLICY FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE which said at page 2: "Now, midway in
the twentieth century, two facts have become compellingly clear. The first is that water
is limited in relation to the many and varied needs for its use. These needs will grow
in size and complexity as the population grows and as industry develops. More water
for domestic use is needed by our growing towns and cities. More water must be used
to bring new lands into production in the West. New industrial techniques, such as
those developed in the chemical industries, synthetic fuel production, and the harnessing
of atomic power, bring with them increasing demands for water."
The prefatory note to the MODEL WATER USE ACT, adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1958 explains: "The demand for
water is growing constantly throughout the United States. This seems to be brought
about by an every increasing population and by expanding economic activities of many
types. Consumption of water per capita appears to be increasing as our population
grows.
"Industry is migrating into the countryside and requires large quantities of water for
processing, for steam electric power, and for the making of the many modern devices
and appliances required for our comforts. Agriculture is becoming more intensified
through irrigation, drainage, flood protection, and other conservation practices. Water
to provide critical seasonal needs for crops and livestock is a prime factor to be considered in modern, large scale farming in the so-called humid east, as well as in the
west. Water seems to be a key factor now in all this burgeoning growth of our nation.
In some areas and states supplies are currently inadequate to meet local demands,
especially in the critical summer seasons. In other areas supplies for present and future
uses require careful management if all needs are to served wisely."
In an article entitled The American West, Perpetual Mirage, Harper's Magazine,
May, 1957, pp. 25, 28, the historian Walter Prescott Webb spoke of the water situation
in the West in frightening terms: "The overriding influence that shapes the West is the
desert.... Within the desert states, the people have not overdrawn their water supply.
They have struck a balance with their possibilities. This is not true in the rim states
[of which Washington is one] where the great cities are. Today most of these cities
have outgrown their water supply and are in crisis."
See also COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GovERNMENT, TASK FORCE REPORT ON WATER RESOURCES AND POWER, 4 (1955).
MITTEE
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•the benefits of the available water supply. Of particular significance
was the establishment of the Pollution Control Commission in 19451
which was directed to "maintain the highest possible standards to insure the purity of all waters of the state consistent with public health
and public enjoyment thereof, the propagation and protection of wildlife, birds, games, fish and other aquatic life, and the industrial development of the state... ."' In 1957 the Metropolitan Municipal Corporation Statute was enacted5 declaring among other things that it
was the policy of the state to provide regional solutions to problems
of "sewage and garbage disposal [and] water supply."'6 Also in 1957
a statute was enacted establishing a Weather Modification board" empowered to establish "standards and instructions to govern the carrying out of research or projects in weather modification and control."'
On the federal level we have seen legislation authorizing the construction of numerous hydro-electric, and multiple purpose dams in and
about the state; dams that supply us with huge amounts of power,
flood control, and water for irrigation.'
The above legislation has been enacted as a result of the increasing
need for efficiency in utilizing the available waters of the state. It has
not, however, been based on any comprehensive survey of those water
resources and the demands on them. Such a survey is much needed.
A possible step toward meeting this need was recently taken by the
Legislative Council of the State of Washington in the appointment of
a Water Resources Advisory Committee,"0 composed of 15 persons
representing different water uses, whose purpose is to study virtually
every phase of water use." These studies will be made available to
the legislature for possible legislative action.
3 RCW 43.54.

4RCW 90.48.010.
5RCW 35.58.
6 RCW 35.58.010.
7 RCW 43.37
8RCW 43.37.030 (2).
9 The Columbia Basin Project alone will soon have almost one million acres under
irrigation. A comprehensive study of the potential of the Columbia River Basin may be
found in 2 TEN RIvERs IN AMERICA'S FUTURE 1 (1950). In addition see: Joint Hearings before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and a Special Subcommittee
of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 162 (1956).
10 This committee was established by Resolution of the House of Representatives of
the State of Washington, adopted February 20, 1959. The chairman is Mr. Lawrence E.
Hall, Bellevue, Washington.
1 The 'Work Program" of the committee, dated December 16, 1959, states that it
shall proceed as rapidly as possible to study: "Existing water resources of the State,
means and methods of conserving and augmenting such water resources, existing and
contemplated needs and uses of water for domestic, municipal, irrigation, power development, navigation, industrial, mining, recreation, livestock, wildlife, fishlife, waste dispersion and assimilation, and all other related subjects, including drainage, flood control.
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Washington is not alone in its recognition of the need for a reappraisal of its water controls. Similar action is being taken by many
other states, and for much the same reasons as here. In the eastern
part of the United States, where the riparian system prevails, there
has been a rash of state study groups on water problems. One of the
results of that activity has been the approval by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws of a Model Water Use
Act, 12 designed primarily for consideration by the eastern states, but

of interest to legislators in all areas. It incorporates aspects of both
the appropriation and riparian systems.
The purpose of this article is to assist in the re-examination of
Washington water law by looking at the parts of that law encompassed
within the labels "riparian" and "appropriation." 1 The first few pages
will sketch some of the current trends in water use, showing some of
the remarkable differences in use between the first part of the century
and today, and between the eastern and western parts of the state.
The balance of the article will examine the two systems to see where
they are meeting current needs of the state and where they are not.
Several questions will be discussed; e.g., how do the riparian and appropriation systems combine in this state? In the area of conflict between these two systems, where does the riparian system enjoy a
preferred status, and where the appropriation system? What trends
are visible in each of these systems, and in the combination? Are
these trends desirable? With a few obvious exceptions the material
discussed will pertain only to the nonnavigable waters of the state, the
smaller lakes and streams. The exceptions include (1) a discussion of

and reclamation." [The Committee] recognizes that it has the responsibility for supplying technical and factual information for the comprehensive study which may serve as
a basis for legislation deemed warranted by the Legislative Council's Subcommittee on
Natural Resources.
12 NATIONAL

CONFERENCE

OF

COMMIISSIONERS

ON

UNIFORM

STATE

LAWS,

MODEL

WATER USE ACT (approved 1958).
13 For prior articles and papers on various aspects of Washington water law see:
Morris, Washington Water Rights-A Sketch. 31 WASH. L. REV. 243 (1956) ; Horowitz, Riparian and Appropriation Rights to the Use of Water in Washington 7 WASH.
L. REV. 197 (1932) ; Johnson, Cases on the Law of Natural Resources. Water-TimberMining (1959). In the University of Washington Law School Library are a number
of unpublished papers dealing with various phases of water law: Roe, "Navigability in
Washington" (1960) ; Bingham, "Loss of Water Rights" (1948) ; Emick, "The Extent
of the Riparian Landowner's Rights to the Use of Water in the State of Washington"
(1948) ; Hall, "The Transfer of Water Rights in Washington" (1948) ; Wilson, "The
Acquisition and Extent of Water Rights Acquired Through Appropriation, Prescription and Condemnation" (1948) ; Kellogg, "Littoral and Riparian Rights in Navigable
Waters" (1927) ; Bailey, "Washington Water Rights" (1923). Various Casenotes have
also been published on water rights cases from time to time.
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what is meant by "navigable," and (2) whether riparian rights exist
on navigable waters.
In Washington it is necessary when evaluating water controls to
keep in mind not only the increasing number of uses for the available
water, but also the vastly different climatological conditions prevailing
on either side of the Cascade mountains." The eastern part of the
state is made up of large, open plains and plateaus, well suited for
farming and irrigation. But the rainfall throughout a large portion of
this region runs as little as eight inches per annum. The need for
water during the irrigation season is so great that frequently streams
are completely used up for this purpose, so that no water can be
found at the mouth. The state water code provides for a litigation
process to determine in one hearing all the appropriative rights in a
given river basin. Of the streams that have gone through that process fifty-seven of them have been east of the Cascades; only one has
been on the western side." A sampling of supreme court cases involving appropriation problems reveals a similar ratio." As one might
anticipate, the amount of irrigated land on the eastern side far exceeds that on the west." On the eastern side the primary use of the
14 For a general statement of the climatological and hydrological problems occurring
in Washington see REPORT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON TO UNITED STATES SELECT

COMMITTEE ON NATiONAL WATER REsouRcEs (1959).
15 U.S. Department of Commerce, Weather Bureau, Climates of the States, Feb.

1960. The figures referred to were based on figures obtained over the period 1931-55.
They show that the trianagular area, Yakima, Pasco, Quincy receives about eight
inches of rainfall per year. They also show that by far the bulk of the eastern part of
the state receives less than 16 inches per annum.
16

RCW 90.12

17The Yakima-Ellensburg area and the Walla Walla-Dayton area are the two most
completely adjudicated areas in the state. According to the records of the Department
of Water Resources there are only 58 adjudicated streams in the state.
Is Of 25 Washington cases involving appropriation issues which were checked at
random, only three concerned rivers west of the Cascades.
19 In the publication by WASHINGTON POLLUTION CONTROL COMMISSION, CLEAN
WATER AND YOU (1951), the breakdown of irrigated land in the state was as follows:
460,000 acres
Yakima V alley ..................................................................................................
83,000 acres
North Central Wash. (Douglas, Chelan, and Okanogan) ......................
Walla Walla River Basin (Columbia and Walla Walla Counties) ...... 25,000 acres
22,000 acres
Spokane Valley .....................................................................................
Other -Eastern W ashington localities ................................................ 7.......... 40,000 acres
40,000 acres
West of Cascade Mts. (Supplemental Irrigation) ...............
Total 670,000 acres
These figures would appear to be too low when compared to the records of the Division
of Water Resources. These records indicate that since 1917 permits have been granted
for the irrigation by surface and ground water combined of 171,912 acres of land west
of the Cascades, and 235,553 acres of land east of the mountains. These figures are not
fully accurate, or complete, either. They do not show the number of acres that have
been taken out of irrigation after the permits were issued. Furthermore they do not
show the very substantial amounts of acreage, particularly in the eastern part of the
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smaller rivers and streams is for irrigation-without which the economy would collapse." This is not true on the western side, as will be
shown below.
The western part of the state is composed in large part of deep,
heavily wooded canyons, quite unsuited for any agriculture except
tree farming. It is true that near Puget Sound there are some areas
which provide rich farmland, but on a much smaller scale than on the
eastern side. The rainfall west of the mountains, except in one relatively small area, 2 ' runs above thirty inches per annum, and gets above
120 inches in places on the western slopes of the Olympics and Cascades." During ten months of the year the problem frequently is how
to get rid of the water, not how to get more of it, although somewhat
strangely, during the crucial farming months of July and August the
rainfall drops off severely, requiring farmers to resort to widespread
supplemental irrigation.2
On the western side of the mountains, irrigation has never enjoyed
the preferred status that it has on the eastern side. Navigation, power
generation, domestic supply, and industry have insisted upon equal,
if not greater recognition. The requirements of industry in particular
have been very substantial, and will likely double in the next ten
years. 4 In addition, two relatively new uses are demanding greater
state, that are watered through rights, both riparian and appropriative, acquired prior
to the enactment of the 1917 water code. Virtually all of the large irrigation districts
in the eastern part of the state acquired their water rights prior to the enactment of
the code.
20 The Pollution Control Commission reported that in 1950 the "average value
of crop production per acre for crops produced in the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
Irrigation Projects in the Yakima Valley . . . was $134. Examples of typical per acre
crop values are as follows: Hops, $1,300; Apples, $1,200; Potatoes, $340; Sugar
Beets, $175; Alfalfa, $70; Pasture, $.10. These are per acre crop values on land worth
possibly a dollar an acre without water ....
It is believed that an average of $125 per
acre can be applied as the value of crop production for all irrigated lands of the state.
This gives an annual value of water for this purpose of $84,000,000. . . . Beyond any
doubt, water for irrigation is the foundation of the economy of the whole [Yakima]
valley."

WASHINGTON

POLLUTION CONTROL COMMISSION, CLEAN WATER AND You

(1951).
21 The so called "Banana" belt of Washington, around Sequim on the northeast side
of the Olympic peninsula records only 16.92 inches of rain per annum
22 U.S. Department of Commerce, Weather Bureau, Climate of the States, Feb.,
1960.
23 This is sometimes called supplemental irrigation because less water is needed to
bring the soil to maximum productivity than is required for land on the east side of
the state. The records of the Department of Water Resources indicate that the land
on the east side usually requires about twice as much water per acre as that on the
west.
24 The report of the Washington Pollution Control Commission contained in Addendum 7 of the REPORT OF STATE OF WASHINGTON TO UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT
COM MITTEE ON NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES (1959) reveals that the present industrial use in this state is approximately 1.2 billion gallons per day. The Commission then
estimated that by 1980 this figure would increase to about 2.2 billion gallons per day.
The largest users at present are the pulp and paper industry, 640 million gallons per day,
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attention, i.e., recreation and homesite locations. The use of water for
recreation ,has become increasingly important in this state, as well as
in the nation.2 5 Giving legal protection to such use appears to be justified not only on the ephemeral, but real need to protect the health
and welfare of the state's citizens, but also to protect the considerable economic activity created by that use. The available statistics"
the Chemicals, Oil and Metal industries, 226 million gallons per day, and the Lumber
industry, 201.5 million gallons per day. The bulk of the industrial uses are located
on the west side of the mountains.
25 For responsible statements on the growing value of recreation to the social and
economic life of the United States see the REPORT OF THE PRSmENT'S WATER RESOURCES POLICY COMMISSION, "A WATER POLICY FOR THE: AMERICAN PEOPLE," Ch. 16

(1950), 'and NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS OF UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
MODEL WATER USE AcT (1958) (Prefatory note).

26 The 1951 report of the Pollution Control Commission commented on the intrinsic
value of the waters of the state for recreational purposes, and then endeavored to relate
this value to the tourist trade, saying: "the recreational facilities offered by the State
do have certain economic values which cannot be overlooked and which can be estimated. One of these is the result of tourist travel within the state. Why is the tourist
industry of Washington of such proportions as to rank among the top industries, and
why is it increasing with such rapidity? The answer, of course, is that the State has
such unlimited recreational resources. Mountains, timber and water, with all the charm
and beauty which go with the combination of these natural facilities, is the attraction
drawing tourists to this Pacific Northwest.' WASHINGTON POLLUTION CONTROL COMMISSION, CLEAN WATER AND YOU (1951).
Precise figures establishing the recreational value of our rivers and lakes in dollars
and cents are not available. There are, however, some figures which are relevant to
this question. Of particular note is a book, WALLACE, AN EvALUATON OF WILDLIFE
RESOURCES IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON (1956). This study was based on a questionnaire mailed to 1,051 resident sportsmen in Washington in 1954. The figures collected showed the amount of money spent by these sportsmen in connection with their
various sporting activities. The figures showed that resident, licenseholding fishermen
spent $37,281,000 in 1954 in direct connection with the pursuit of their sport. This
amounted to about $152 per individual, a surprisingly high figure. These figures do not
include the expenditures by nonresidents, or nonlicense holders. 'The figure of
$37,281,000 compares to $48,988,000 which was the amount of retail sales in the Dairy
and Creamery business in Washington in the same year, and $65,015,000 for retail
sales of packaged spirits, wine and beer.
Currently the state Department of Game plants over 40,000,000 trout each year in
Washington's lakes and streams. The Department estimates that about 25,000,000 of
these are caught annually.
Washington has 49 state parks, 34 of which boast swimming or fishing. The attractiveness of a number of others is considerable enhanced by the proximity; of lakes or
streams. Between October 1, 1958, and September 30, 1959, a total of 7,064,000 people
visited these parks. The State Parks Commission estimates this figure will exceed 13,000,000 by 1967. (Letter, Sept. 2, 1960, from Ruth E. Pike, Supervisor of Public Information, State Parks and Recreation Commission). In 1956 about 39 per cent of those
camping overnight in the state parks were from out of state (Washington State Parks
and Recreation Commission. We Came to Camp in Washington State Parks, An overnight camping survey. (1956) Statistics published by the Washington State Department of Commerce and Economic Development reveal that from June 16 to September
15, 1959, 2,791,000 nonresidents visited Washington, and that these persons stayed an
average of 4.9 days in the state. 1,900,000 of these persons travelled here for vacations
and other pleasure. While in the state this latter group spent an estimated $45,000,000.
(These figures were recently published in a brochure by the Business and Economic
Research Division of the Department of Economic Development of Washington.)
None of the above statistics, or reports, directly tells us the monetary value of our
lakes and streams for recreational purposes. However, they are sufficient to lead one
to believe that this value is substantial, and worth preserving.
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indicate that we could not well afford to allow water laws to exist
which would impair the use of these waters for recreational purposes,
whether by state residents or others.
The use of lakes and streams for homesite locations is another factor of growing importance in state water control. In the distant past
this use was limited to those waters immediately adjacent to the cities
and towns, and was thus not too significant. In recent years we have
seen a tremendous increase in the efficiency of transportation. Permanent homes are being built much farther away from the cities than
before, and summer homes can be found everywhere in the state. The
enjoyment as well as the status value of living by a lake or stream is
widely recognized and sought. Although no figures appear to be available on the value of riparian property devoted to homesite purposes,
it would seem clear to one who has seen many of the state's lakes
that this value must be enormous.
Another fact to be noted about water use in Washington concerns
the different way in which natural lakes and streams are used. Irrigation continues to be an extremely important economic use of the
streams, undoubtedly the most valuable use on many of them. On the
other hand this use plays only a small, if not insignificant part, in the
use of the vast majority of natural lakes, whether on the eastern or
western side. The principal use of such lakes appears to be for recreation and homesite purposes.
We can summarize the above by saying that although irrigation still
holds, and will continue to hold, an important position with regard to
water use in Washington, particularly on the eastern side of the state,
there are a number of other uses that now demand equal, if not greater
protection. We have gone from a period in the early history of the
state when irrigation was clearly the dominant economic use, to a
period of multiple uses, each demanding more or less equal status.
Let's see whether and how the law has conformed to these changes.
THE RIPARIAN SYSTEM

A look at a weather map of the United States reveals that where
there is an abundance of water the riparian system alone has been
adopted-this system prevails in all of the states east of the North
Dakota-Texas tier." Where there is somewhat less water the riparian
2 Some states that initially adopted the riparian system have since modified it by
legislation to bring in aspects of the appropriation doctrine. See for example recent
legislation in Minnesota and Mississippi.
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and appropriation systems have been adopted in combination, as in
Washington, Oregon, California, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. These states form the borders
of what was once designated the "Great American Desert." The states
in this latter area, Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Utah, Nevada, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico have adopted the appropriation system exclusively.
Among the states having only one of these systems exclusively, comparisons of the rules applicable in various situations is both possible
and useful. This is seldom true of comparisons between those states
having mixed systems,28 particularly when the investigation goes to
the question of how the two systems integrate. California and Washington may be pointed to as examples. The California rule as to the
status of riparian rights often depends upon the date of acquisition of
title to the land, or to the appropriative right.2 " No appropriative
rights of any kind could be acquired prior to 1866. Even after that
date, if a parcel of riparian land was patented from the United States
prior to the making of a conflicting appropriation then the riparian
rights were vested and could not be disturbed ° Some of the harshness (to appropriators) of this rule was later modified by a 1928 constitutional amendment." But still in California one of the basic questions to be answered in a riparian-appropriator conflict is, when was
title to the riparian land acquired from the United States? Washington, on the other hand, has seldom given much weight to the title
question. Instead, in order to meet the great need for irrigation, the
state supreme court simply modified the riparian doctrine, ruling by

28

MARTZ, CASES ON NATURAL RESOURCES 69 (1951).
29 For a discussion of the California water rights system see HUTCHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 40-67 (1956).
30 Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 4 Pac. 919 (1884), 10 Pac. 674 (1886).

31 CALIF. CONST., art. XIV, § 3. The necessity for a constitutional amendment was
indicated by the case of Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 200 Cal. 81, 252
Pac. 607 (1926), which was the latest of a line of decisions upholding the riparian
right as against that of an appropriator notwithstanding the unreasonableness or wastefulness of the riparian use. A section was added to the constitution prohibiting waste
or unreasonable use by riparians, as well as others. It provided in part that the riparian
right "to water or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural stream or water
course in this State is and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and shall not extend
to the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use or unreasonable
method of diversion of water."
Cases commenting on the purpose of this amendment include: United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950) ; Gin S. Chow v. Santa Barbara, 217 Cal.
673, 22 P.2d 5 (1933) ; Meridian Ltd. v. City of San Francisco, 13 Cal. 2d 424, 90 P.2d

537 (1939).
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case law3" that riparians did not have as extensive rights as they did
under the common law, 3 or in California. 4 The Washington law has
further split from that of California as a result of the particular form
and timing of the 1917 water code and cases following it. This disparity, between the California and Washington water systems, is typical of the differences between states having combined systems.
In spite of the diversity of rules in the "combination" states, it is
nevertheless true that they share a common source for their basic
system of riparian rights. That source is the jurisprudence of the
eastern states and of England. 5 If one looks only at the riparian side
of the laws in these states and not to the manner in which those rights
combine with the appropriation systems, it is possible to elicit some
useful general principles. Some of these are discussed below.
The riparian system originated and grew from natural causes, from
It is
the natural relationship that certain land occupies to water.
distinctly of common law origin, and has insistently retained a characteristic flexibility that confounds the lawyer seeking certainty, as
much as it pleases the economist seeking a system that can mould itself
to the changing needs of our times. A wide variety of factors influence this flexibility, some of the more important of which are, the
remarkable difference in geographical relationship of water to land
from place to place, the amount of water available at a given place,
and the principal economic uses for it.
It is widely recognized that each state has full power to declare and
shape the riparian rights that will abide within its borders." Certainly
the Washington courts have done just that. Riparian rights of some
kind have always been recognized here. Yet the particular form
and shape they have taken has frequently resulted more from the local
geography and economic need than the calling up of rules from other
jurisdictions.
32 Brown v. Chase, 125 Wash. 542, 217 Pac. 23 (1923) discussed at length later in
this article, substantially limited the riparian right of irrigation, or diverting the
water for any purpose.
33 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES § 742, 748 (3d ed. 1911).
34 Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 200 Cal. 83, 252 Pac. 607 (1926).
35 HUTCHINS, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST 38-9 (1942).
36 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES § 709 (3d ed. 1911). In the case
of Turner v. James Canal Co., 155 Cal. 82, 99 Pac. 520 (1909), at 522, the court said
of the riparian system: "It comes from the situation of the land with respect to the
water, the opportunity afforded thereby to divert and use the water upon the land,
the natural advantages and benefits resulting from the relative positions, and the presumption that the owner of the land acquired it with a view to the use and enjoyment
of these opportunities, advantages and benefits."
37 Port of Seattle v. Oregon & W. R.R., 255 U.S. 56 (1921).
38 Benton v. Johncox, 17 Wash. 277, 39 Pac. 485 (1897).
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Virtually all states having the riparian system agree on the principle
that there is no riparian right to have the water of a river flow past
one's property in its natural state. Instead one must allow reasonable
uses by other riparians, both above and below, and can make only
reasonable uses of the water on one's own land. 9 Beyond this generalization we are faced with a myriad of individual "rights" that have
been recognized from time to time in various places. Often there is
an inconsistency in these rights from state to state and from one time
to another. In Washington some of the riparian rights that have been
recognized are: the right to access, to swim, bathe, fish, boat, to allow
livestock to occupy riparian land and thus permit drainage from their
pasture to flow into the water,"0 to irrigate riparian land,4 ' to prevent
a nonriparian from making any "customary" appropriation on private
land whether or not one's own use is affected, 2 to prevent a nonriparian from floating across or fishing in the waters of a stream where
the riparian owns the bed, 3 to enjoin uses of the water for boating or
swimming by other riparians or their licensees to the extent that such
uses constitute a nuisance,"" to have the water of a lake lap one's shores
"as they were wont to do,"'" to hold title to the bed if the water is
nonnavigable, 6 and to eject a trespasser from tideland under navigable waters in front of riparian land if the trespasser is not acting
under authority of the state.' Many other individual rights could be
set out, but the above are sufficient to demonstrate the diverse nature
of such rights. The discussion that follows will consider many of these
rights in detail, and will show how they are sometimes recognized and
protected in one state while ignored in another, and at times given
only sporadic protection in a single state.
3
MARaTZ, CASES ON NATURAL RESOURCES 719 (1951) ; WiEL, WATER RIGHTS
WEsTERN STATES § 739 (3d ed. 1911); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 850-57 (1939).

IN THE

4oIn re Clinton Water Dist., 36 Wn.2d. 284, 218 P.2d 309 (1950).

4" Brown v. Chase,'125 Wash. 542, 217 Pac. 23 (1923).
42 Wallace v. Weitman, 52 Wn.2d 585, 328"P.2d 157 (1958). Prior to the 1917 water
code there were two ways to obtain an appropriative right: (1) The "customary"
method of merely appropriating the water on the public domain and putting it to
beneficial use, Thorpe v. Tenem Ditch Co., 1 Wash. 566, 20 Pac. 588 (1889). No valid
"customary" appropriation could be made by a diversion on private land. (2) Between
1891 and 1917 one could also obtain an appropriative right by a statutory "notice"
system which required the posting of a notice at the point of diversion. Wash. Sess.
Laws 1891, c. 142. See In re Icicle Creek, 159 Wash. 524, 294 Pac. 245 (1930). Under
the rule of the Weitman case, and Mally v. Weidensteiner, 88 Wash. 398, 153 Pac.
342 (1915), a riparian could enjoin any "customary" diversion by a nonriparian on

private land, whether or not the riparian was actually injured.
43

Griffith v. Holman, 23 Wash. 347, 63 Pac. 239 (1900).

44 Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wn.2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956).
45 Litka

v. Anacortes, 167 Wash. 259, 9 P.2d 88 (1932) ; In re Martha Lake Water

Co., 152 Wash. 53, 277 Pac. 382 (1929)
46 Griffith v. Holman, 23 Wash. 347, 63 Pac. 239 (1900).

47 West Coast Improvement Co. v. Winsor, 8 Wash. 490, 36 Pac. 441 (1894).
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The variability and uncertainty in the riparian system presents particular problems in a "combination" state such as Washington. The
rights of appropriators, present and future, are fairly easily determined
under the 1917 water code. Although the code is not perfect, it does
give a considerable degree of certainty where it is deemed to apply.
The difficulty is that there are many areas where one can not be completely certain that the code will apply, because opposing it and reaching into many of the same spheres of economic activity, is the riparian
system. The case law announced immediately after the enactment of
the 1917 code indicated that the appropriation system was gaining
ground in these areas of conflict. Cases of more recent vintage seem
to indicate that the pendulum has edged back in some areas toward
riparianism.
One of the first questions to be answered in analyzing the current
status of Washington water law is, what did the appropriation code
and subsequent cases do to the riparian system? What riparian rights
have survived that code? Which of these exist today?
How DO

THE APPROPRIATION AND RIPARIAN SYSTEMS
COMBINE IN

WASHINGTON?

The most serious conflict between the riparian and appropriation
systems began with the enactment of the appropriation code of 1917
which provides48 as follows:
The power of the state to regulate and control the waters within the
state shall be exercised hereinafter in this title provided. Subject to
existing rights, all waters within the state belong to the public, and any
right thereto, or to the use thereof, shall be acquired only by appropriation for a beneficial use and as provided in this title. As between
appropriations, the first in time shall be the first in right. Nothing in
this title shall lessen, enlarge, or modify the rights of a riparianowner
existing as of June 6, 1917, or any right however acquired existing as
of that date, except that they shall be subject to condemnation for
public use, and the amount and priority thereof may be determined as
hereinafter provided. [Emphasis added.]

The italicized portions of the above statute raise but do not answer
an important question, i.e., what were the "existing" riparian rights as
of June 6, 1917? It has often been said that riparian rights are not
gained by use, nor lost by disuse and that they are not merely appurtenances but are part and parcel of the land.4" Thus it could be
RCW 90.04.020.
49 Rigney v. Tacoma Light & Water Co., 9 Wash. 576, 38 Pac. 147 (1894).

48

WiEL,
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urged that the 1917 code had no effect upon any of those rights, including the right to irrigate, because they all "existed" prior to the
code and were preserved by its saving clause even though they had
not yet been exercised. Strangely, the cases in this state have not yet
clearly answered this question, although the executive branch has
taken a definite stand on it.5" The supreme court opinion that sheds
the most light here is Brown v. Chase.' Certain riparians on the Wenatchee River sought to block the issuance of an appropriation permit
to nonriparian defendants. The permit would have allowed temporary
storage of the water each year in Lake Wena tchee for release during
the irrigation season. Although the riparians could show no harm to
their lands either presently or prospectively they nevertheless contended they had a legal right to bar the appropriation. The court
declined to agree, stating "Waters of nonnavigable streams in excess
of the amount which can be beneficially used, either directly or prospectively, within a reasonable time,, on, or in connection with riparian
lands, are subject to appropriation for use on nonriparian lands." 2
Thus it would seem that in Washington the riparian right to appropriate water for use on riparian land is not always an "existing" right.
If it were "existing" the court would have to hold that any appropriation that deprived one of this right could be made only upon the
payment of "just compensation" to the riparian. It did not do so.
Instead, it held that as against a conflicting prior appropriation under
the code such a riparian right does not exist. Does the Brown case
also mean that if the riparian had not made his appropriation prior
to June 6, 1917, and did not intend to do so within a reasonable time
thereafter he is forever barred from taking such action? It would
seem so, although the opinion does not directly answer the question.
Under Brown v. Chase, a riparian who on June 6, 1917, had not actually appropriated water for use on his land and did not intend to do
so within a reasonable time thereafter could not be said to have an
"existing" right as of the date of the code. His right to appropriate
is actually "gained" by present or prospective use. Not having been
WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES § 711 (3d ed. 1911); 2 FARNHAM, WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 463, 534 (1904) ; Morris, Washington Water Rights-A Sketch,
31 50
WASH. L. REv. 243 (1956).

The policy of the Division of Water Resources of the Department of Conservation
and Development, as stated in a letter from Murray G. Walker, Supervisor of that
Division, to the author, dated January 24, 1956, is as follows: "A riparian owner is
treated in the same manner as any other person desiring to place waters to a beneficial use. He must apply for a permit to appropriate."
51125 Wash. 542, 217 Pac. 23 (1923).
52 Id.at 553, 217 Pac. at 26.
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in existence at the time of the code it could not have been saved by
the savings clause.
There is another reason why such a riparian right should not exist
in this state. One of the basic purposes of the water code is to bring
as much certainty as practicable to the ownership and control of water
rights. If a riparian today could appropriate without proceeding
through the code there would be no record of his appropriation in the
state files, and the uncertainty already existing in this state by reason
of pre-1917 riparian diversions53 would increase.
The above discussion concerns only those riparian rights which are
also subject to acquisition as appropriative rights. These are the ones
most likely to have been eliminated by the code, although in one case
a dissenting judge suggested that possibly a number of others (swimming, boating, and fishing) were relegated to an inferior status by
the code.54
Let's examine some of these other riparian rights to see how they
have withstood the attempts at erosion by the appropriation system.
One such right is sometimes referred to as the right to have the water
"lap [one's] shores as they were by nature wont to do." 5 This particular right is vital to the continued value of the thousands of summer homes built on the lakes of the state. If appropriators could
reduce the water level of these lakes without payment of compensa53 Most of the better farm land on the eastern side of the Cascade mountains was
put under irrigation prior to 1917. A substantial share of that irrigation was done
under rights claimed by farmers as riparians-rights which are still valid. No record
of these rights was required to be filed in any public office; accurate records were
seldom kept by the individuals themselves. Many additional pre 1917 diversions for
irrigation were made under the "customary" or "notice" theories of appropriation which
again required no adequate public record to be made. The result is that the present
records of the Division of Water Resources cover only a relatively small portion of
the appropriations actually being made in the state today. It is true that 51 streams
of the state have gone through the water code's litigation process, and thus the rights
on them are fully determined and recorded. However, this is only a small portion of
the streams that ought to have such action. At the present time the Division of Water
Resources lacks both money and personnel to guide other basins through this exacting
process.
54 Hill, J., in the dissent in I,t re Clinton Water Dist., 36 Wn.2d 284, 218 P.2d 309
(1950) suggested that under the exercise of the state's police power through the 1917
code even the riparian rights of swimming, fishing, and boating were secondary to
the rights of appropriators. It was not contended that riparians, or others, had to apply
(or could apply) under the code for the acquisition of such rights, but rather that
(1) the state became the owner of the water by that act, (2) appropriation was given
a status of priority under that act, (3) swimming, fishing, and other uses made of the
water itself, not under a code permit, are privileges engaged in only by consent of the
state and are by the same token subject to loss where they come into conflict with
appropriative rights.
55 This quote is from the dissent in It re Clinton Water Dist. 36 Wn.2d 284, 295,
218 P.2d 309, 316 (1950). Cases protecting this right are: Litka v. Anacortes, 167
Wash. 259, 9 P.2d 88 (1932) ; In re Martha Lake Water Co., 152 Wash. 53, 277 Pac.
382 (1929).
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tion to riparian for resulting damage, many riparian lands would suffer
a substantial diminution in value.
The supreme court held early, in In re Martha Lake Water Co.,5"
that an appropriator, even acting under the code, had no right to lower
the level of a nonnavigable natural lake, so as to expose the lake bottom, to the damage of riparians. This case did not affect the rule of
the earlier decision in Proctor v. Sim57 that a riparian who owned all
the land around and under a natural lake in the eastern part of the
state could not stop an appropriator from taking some of the water
where no harm resulted to the riparian land. In the Martha Lake
case the state had granted a permit for the appropriation of water
from a lake which would have lowered the water level about twelve
inches and bared from eight to fifty feet of muddy lake bottom. The
riparian owners had purchased their land for homesites, and for ready
access to fishing, swimming, and boating. The court rejected the argument that the Brown case gave paramount status to appropriators in
this situation and held that the water could not be appropriated unless
the riparians were first compensated for the damage that would be
caused their lands. A similar result was reached a short time later
in the case of Litka v. Anacortes.8
In 1950 another case was decided that drew the outer limits of the
appropriation system in still another area of conflict with riparianism.
This case, In re Clinton Water District,8 involved a conflict between
riparians and appropriators on Deer Lake, a natural lake on Whidbey
Island in the western part of the state. The riparians used their land
for homesites and for pasturing livestock, and used the water for swimming, boating and fishing. The Water District sought a permit to appropriate water for domestic use. Upon denial of the application this
action was brought to require its issuance. The Water District contended that the appropriation of the water would not, in itself, affect
any riparian uses or values. However, state health statutes forbade
the deposit of any polluting substance in a lake used for drinking purposes. Regulations of the State Board of Health forbade fishing, boating, bathing or wading in such waters. The majority of the court
assumed that if the appropriation were authorized the health authorities would enforce the regulations and thus the riparians would be
50 152 Wash. 53, 277 Pac. 382 (1929).
57 134 Wash. 606, 236 Pac. 114 (1925).
58 167 Wash. 259, 9 P.2d 88 (1932).
59 36 Wn.2d 284, 218 P.2d 309 (1950).
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effectively deprived of their use of the lake. The court therefore affirmed the refusal to issue an appropriation permit.
It will be observed that the above cases all involved lakes, as distinguished from rivers and streams. It would, in fact, be surprising
to find such a rule applied to rivers and streams. In the first place
the physical situation on a stream is usually quite different. The water
level on virtually all streams fluctuates substantially with the seasons.
Riparian proprietors seldom build houses or plan their recreation with
a specific water level in mind. Dams in existence, and now being
built, will undoubtedly tend to stabilize some stream levels, however,
there will still be much more fluctuation than is usual on a lake. In
addition the prevailing custom and belief in this state is that the first
duty of stream water is to irrigate farmland, and that riparian uses
come second. Certainly it is true that the streams of the state, particularly on the eastern side of the mountains, are substantially reduced in volume each year, and are at times dried up entirely, without
significant complaint from riparians.
On the other hand the rule of the Clinton Water District case would
seem to apply all the more cogently to the rivers and streams of the
state. It would seem most unlikely that a court would hold that an
appropriation for domestic (municipal) use on the lower reaches of a
Washington river could require riparians, and for that matter the public, to cease using the water for fishing, swimming, boating, and pasture drainage, from that point up.
The Martha Lake, Litka, and Clinton Water District cases all arose
on the western side of the state. Would the same rule apply on the
eastern side? Probably so. To date the court has not been inclined
to make geographical distinctions in the application of water laws.6"
Furthermore there would not seem to be any strong reason to do so.
The records of the Division of Water Resources indicate that only a
few appropriations are being made from natural lakes on the eastern
side of the state, and even these are not usually sufficient to alter
appreciably the water level, or require quality control. Homes and
recreational activities on the eastern side of the state are being centered around lakes in much the same way that they are on the west.
It seems likely that the value of these activities is too great to permit

60 See for example the discussion of this matter in Benton v. Johncox, 17 Wash.
277, 49 Pac. 495 (1897).
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the announcement of a rule that would cause their serious damage or
destruction.
RIPARIAN RIGHTs-WHERE T=EHn Is No CONFLICT WITH
APPROPRIATIvE RIGHTS

The Distinction Between Navigable and Nonnavigable Waters.
In Washington there are many differences between the riparian rights
that apply to property adjacent to navigable waters, and those that
apply to property lying on nonnavigable waters. It has frequently
been-said that in Washington there are no riparian rights to navigable waters." The cases collected in the following pages will debunk
this notion. However, it is true that riparian rights on navigable
waters are substantially less than the ones accruing to landowners on
nonnavigable waters. For example, only landowners on nonnavigable
waters have a right to access to the water, even against the state.
They also have more extensive rights of fishing, swimming, and boating on the adjacent water; they own the bed; and they have more
extensive powers to limit the use of the adjacent waters by other
persons.- Because of the differences in these rights, it becomes important to determine what waters are navigable.
When Are Waters "Navigable? 2 Navigability is defined in different ways for different purposes, as, for example, for: (1) title to
the bed, (2) right of public use, (3) extent of federal power under
the commerce clause, and (4) extent of federal power under the admiralty clause. Numbers (1) and (2) will be discussed in more detail
below. As for number (3) we may observe that the test for determining the extent of federal control was originally the same as that
for determining the title to beds,6" although in recent years it may
have been somewhat expanded." One aspect of the commerce clause
61 See Port of Seattle v. Oregon & W. R. R., 255 U.S. 56 (1921) ; Hill v. Newell,
86 Wash. 227, 149 Pac. 951 (1915).; State ex rel Ham, Yearsley & Ryrie v. Superior
Court, 70 Wash. 442, 126 Pac. 945 (1912) ; Lownsdale v. Grays Harbor Boom Co.,
54 Wash. 542, 103 Pac. 833 (1909) ; Grays Harbor Boom Co. v. Lownsdale, 54 Wash.
83, 102 Pac. 1041, 104 Pac. 267 (1909) ; Brace & Hergert Mill Co. v. State, 49 Wash.
326,6 95 Pac. 278 (1908).
2 For a collection and appraisal of many of the Washington cases on this subject
see Roe, "Navigability in Washington" (1960), an unpublished research paper in the
University of Washington Law School Library.
63 In United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931) the court said: "The rule of
navigability for rivers is the same whether the question is one of navigability of rivers
of 64
the United States or one of title."
1In United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940), the court
said that waters were navigable under the commerce clause of the federal constitution
if they could be made so with reasonable improvements: "Although navigability to
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cases does deserve special comment. In United States v. Rio Grande
Dam & Irr. Co.,6" decided in 1898, the United States Supreme Court
held that the federal power under the commerce clause permitted congressional control over nonnavigable tributaries of navigable waters,
on the theory that such control was necessary to preserve federal
power over navigable waters. This is not to say, however, that these
waters have now been held navigable.
The federal power under the admiralty clause also extends over
navigable waters.66 Once again, this test is for a different purpose and
care must be used in comparing these and the title cases.
Title to Beds: The Federal Test Controls. Title to beds of fresh
water navigable rivers and lakes vests in each state as it is admitted
to the union. This results from the doctrine of equality of states.
Since the original thirteen states exercised ownership of and control
over the beds of their navigable waters, ownership and control of such
waters also vests in the new states as they are formed."
It is usually said that the federal test controls the determination
of navigability for title purposes. Although there may have been some
doubt about this at one time, that doubt seems to have been resolved
by the United States Supreme Court." The reason for the rule would
appear to be that the disposal of federal domain is involved, and under
article IV, sec. 3(2) of the federal constitution the power to dispose
of such land belongs exclusively to the federal government.69
fix ownership of the river bed or riparian rights is determined ... as of the formation
of the Union in the original states or the admission to statehood of those formed later,
navigability, for the purpose of the regulation of commerce, may later arise. An analogy is found in admiralty jurisdiction, which may be extended over places formerly
nonnavigable." 311 U.S. at 408. At least one state court, State v. Adams, 251 Minn.
521, 89 N.W.2d 661 (1957), has held that the rule of the Appalachian case is still
controlling on the issue of title and that it is now the federal rule. For a discussion
of the applicability of the Appalachian test in Washington, see Strand v. State, 16
Wn.2d 107, 127, 132 P.2d 1011, 1020 (1943).
65 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
66 See United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933) ; Panama Ry. v. Johnson, 264
U.S. 375 (1924) ; In re Garnett, 141 U.S. 1 (1891).
67 United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940) ; United
States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931) ; United States v. Champlin Ref. Co., 156 F.2d 769
(10th Cir. 1946) ; New Whatcom v. Fairhaven Land Co., 24 Wash. 493, 64 Pac. 735
(1901).
68 United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931). "In accordance with the constitutional principle of equality of states, the title to the beds of rivers within Utah passed
to that State when it was admitted to the Union, if the rivers were then navigable;
and, if they were not then navigable, the title to the river beds remained in the United
Sates. The question of navigability is thus determinative of the controversy, and that
is a federal question." A recent and comprehensive discussion of this question may be
found in the case of State v. Adams, 251 Minn. 521, 89 N.W.2d. 661 (1958). See also
Bade, Titles, Points and Lines in Lakes and Streams, 24 MINN. L. REv. 305 (1940),
and Comment, 28 ORE.L. REV. 267 (1949).
69 United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931).
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The federal test was laid down in Daniel Ball v. United States:7"
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which
are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are
used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as
highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. And
they constitute navigable waters of the United States within the meaning of the Acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable
waters of the States, when they form in their ordinary condition by
themselves, or by uniting with'other waters, a continuous highway over
which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign
countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water.
In United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co. " the test was amplified as follows:
The mere fact that logs, poleg and rafts are floated down a stream
occasionally and in times of high water, does not make it a navigable
river.. :. It is not.., every small creek in which a fishing skiff or
gunning canoe can be made to float at high water, which is deemed
navigable, but in order... to give it the character of a navigable
stream... it must be generally and commonly useful to some purpose
of trade or agriculture.
Lakes: Navigability for Title. Has the Washington court adhered
to the federal test in determining the navigability of its lakes? It
would seem so from an examination of the cases, although at no place
has this writer discovered any admission by our court that it deemed
itself bound by that test. The fact is that the federal test is broad
enough to allow considerable latitude by the state courts, and that
latitude has in fact been taken in this state. The early state cases
applied a test that went far toward declaring navigable the vast majority of lakes. The extreme case of this group was Ortel v. Stone,"'
decided in 1922, which held navigable Davis Lake, in Okanogan
county, a lake measuring about Y of a mile by Y of a mile, containing about forty acres, with a depth ranging from ten to fifty feet.
The lake did not connect with other waters, and did not serve any
commercial purpose. (The Washington" court does not consider boat
rentals and resort operation as a commercial purpose.)"3 The court
announced the test that a lake was navigable if it was large enough to
70 77

U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
71174 U.S. 690, 698-99 (1899).
72119 Wash. 500, 205 Pac. 1055 (1922).
73 Snively v. State, 167 Wash. 385, 9 P2d 773 (1932).
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be susceptible of use for commercial purposes-if it was large enough
to float commercial vessels and products-and it made no difference
that no such use had ever been made of it or was likely to be made
of it in the future. The rule of Ortel v. Stone was rejected in Procter
v. Sim,7" decided in 1925. There the court held a twenty-five acre lake
nonnavigable and announced the rule which still prevails to the effect
that a lake used principally as a pleasure resort for boating, fishing,
swimming and skating, is not navigable where it is not situated so that
it can or is likely to be used as a highway for trade or travel or as a
means of commercial transportation. Thus it is not enough that the
lake is physically large enough to float commercial vessels or products. It must be located so that it has been used, or will likely be used
for that purpose.75 Since the Ortel case, several lakes similarly situated but larger in size, have been held nonnavigable. 6
Lakes: Navigability for Public Use. Even though the bed of a lake
is privately owned the riparians and their licensees may have a common right to use the whole surface. This is true in Washington,"7 as
well as a number of other states, as will be indicated in the following
pages. In Washington, however, there are no cases indicating the test
for determining when a body of water is too small to give the riparians
such a right. The single case announcing the common use rule on a
privately owned lake is Snively v. Jaber8 where the court assumed
without discussion that Angle Lake was navigable for this purpose.
This lake was described in an earlier case"9 as being approximately one
mile long, 4 mile wide, containing about 119 acres, and varying in
depth from ten to forty-five feet. There were about 200 summer
homes on the lake. It would further appear that there are few cases
in other jurisdictions raising this question. It was, however, discussed
Wash. 606, 236 Pac. 114 (1925).
The same rule prevails in Minnesota. State v. Adams, 251 Minn. 521, 89 N.W.2d
661 (1957). The court in that case examined a number of cases on the issue of navigability and determined that, under the federal test, for a lake to be navigable it had to
be large enough to float not only commercial vessels, but also had to be so located as
to make such commerce practicable.
76 In Snively v. State, 167 Wash. 385, 9 P.2d 773 (1932), the court held Angle Lake
nonnavigable. It measured one mile by Y4 mile and was from ten to forty feet deep.
In Best v. State of Washington, 153 Wash. 168, 279 Pac. 388 (1929), the court held
nonnavigable a lake measuring ?/ of a mile by Vs mile. In Smith v. State, 184 Wash.
58, 50 P.2d 32 (1935), the court held Cow Lake nonnavigable. It measured one mile
by 1/3 mile, covering about eighty acres, and was eighty feet deep in places. In Lefevre v. State, 195 Wash. 537, 81 P.2d 819 (1938) the court held the 700 acre Silver
Lake nonnavigable.
77 Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wn.2d. 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956).
74134
75

78

Ibid.
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Snively v. State, 167 Wash. 385, 9 P.2d 773 (1932).
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recently in a Minnesota decision, where the court held a private lake
navigable for common riparian use and then said:"0
It does not follow that the foregoing riparian rights rule applies to
every pothole or swamp frequented by wild fowl and over which a
small boat might be poled to retrieve game, but which as a practical
matter does not lend itself in any substantial degree to the customary
propulsion of boats by outboard motors or oars. A minor body of water
which by its nature and character reasonably has no overall utility
common to two or more abutting owners would fall outside the rule.
No hard and fast line can be drawn and each case must be determined
according to its own peculiar facts.
Streams: Navigability for Title. In Washington, as in various other
states,8" the two intrastate purposes for testing the navigability of
rivers and streams are to determine title, and the right of public use.
A stream may be nonnavigable for title purposes (title is then in the
riparians), but navigable for public use. 2 As might be expected where
two tests are very similar, there is occasionally some confusion about
their use."
The cases on title generally state a test that would terminate navigability at a lower point on a given river than those deciding the right,
of public use. The title test was discussed at length in the early case
of Griffith v. Holman,8" where the court quoted with approval from a
number of authorities as follows:
A stream is a public highway wherever it is suitable in its natural
condition for general use in travel or in the transportation of property.
GouL, WATE-Rs, § 107.
The capability of use by the public for purposes of transportation
and commerce affords the true criterion of the navigability of a river,
80 Johnson v. Seifert, 100 N.W2d 689, 697 (Minn. 1960).
s'See for example: Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954) ; Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, 90 Ore. 13, 175 Pac. 437 (1918) ; Micelli v. Andrus, 61
Ore. 78, 120 Pac. 737 (1912).
82 Strand v. State, 16 Wn2d. 107, 132 P.2d 1011 (1943) ; Monroe Mill Co. v. Menzel, 35 Wash. 487, 77 Pac. 813 (1904) ; Watkins v. Dorris, 24 Wash. 636, 64 Pac. 840
(1901).
8
3 In Kemp v. Putnamn, 47 Wn.2d 530, 288 P.2d 837 (1955), the court held the Bogachiel and Quillayute rivers navigable for title. Two of the three Washington cases
relied on in this decision were cases on the right of public use.
84 23 Wash. 347, 63 Pac. 239 (1900). In this case the court held the Little Spokane
River nonnavigable. Thus a riparian who owned the bed was allowed to recover damages against a fisherman who damaged the riparian's fence across the stream and
caught fish over his land. The river was described as forty feet wide, having an average
depth of four feet during three months of the year, and two feet during the other nine
months. During the low water period the water was found to be as shallow as six
inches over certain riffles, however, at all times and places it was large enough to carry
ordinary rowboats. It had never been used for the floating of logs, or any other commercial purpose.
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rather than the extent and manner of that use. The Montello, 20 Wall.
430.
Nor is it every small creek, in which a fishing skiff or gunning canoe
can be made to float, at high water, which is deemed navigable. But
in order to have this character, it must be navigable for some purpose,
useful to trade or agriculture. Rowe v. Granite Bridge Corp., 21 Pick
344.
To go beyond this and declare a stream navigable which can float a
log, would be to turn a rule intended for the benefit of the public, into
an instrument of serious detriment to individuals, if not of actual private oppression. America River Water Co. v. Amsden, 6 Cal. 4432"
Later cases have made it clear that a river need not be navigable at
all times of the year in order to meet the test of navigability for title.
In Kemp v. Putnam6 the court quoted with approval the following:
"The navigability quality of a watercourse need not be continuous, but
the seasons of navigability must occur regularly, and be of sufficient
duration to subserve a useful public purpose for commercial intercourse."

It is probably not enough that the river have merely sufficient size
to float commercial products. To be navigable it must have been actually used for such purposes, or be located in such a manner that
commercial use is more than a mere possibility."
A river is not navigable for title purposes where the only commercial use that can be made of it is for floating logs." Thus in Diking
Dist. No. 2 v. Calispel Duck Club the court said: "A stream which is
navigable only for the purpose of floating logs is not a navigable
stream, within the meaning of our constitutional provisions, art. 17,
85 Id. at 351-54; 63 Pac. at 241-42.
8647 Wn.2d 530, 534, 288 P.2d 837, 840 (1955).

In this case the court held the Quillayute and Bogachiel Rivers navigable, describing them as follows: "In the early days,
these two rivers were the only means of access to the area in which they are located;
lumber, produce, and supplies for the early settlers were transported up and down these
rivers, and for a period of time both rivers were used for the rafting and transporting
of pulpwood; the use of the rivers declined, but in 1921, following a severe wind storm,
as a result of which all roads were blocked, they were again used as the only highway.
The Indians formed the Bogachiel Transportation Company to freight supplies and
to transport men up the river. The testimony further shows that the rivers are in the
same condition today as they were in the early days....
"All of the witneses testified that during the freighting season, from October until
May, the entire channel of the Quillayute and the channel of the Bogachiel, for a distance extending far beyond the appellants' property, are deep, clear, and navigable."
47 Wn.2d at 533, 288 P.2d at 839.
87 Lefevre v. State, 195 Wash. 537, 81 P.2d 819 (1938) ; Snively v. State, 167 Wash.
385, 9 P.2d 773 (1932) ; Best v. State, 153 Wash. 168, 279 Pac. 288 (1929) ; Proctor v.
Sim, 134 Wash. 606, 236 Pac. 114 (1925).
88 Strand v. State, 16 Wn.2d 107, 132 P.2d 1011 (1943) ; Diking Dist. No. 2 v.
Calispel Duck Club, 11 Wn.2d 131, 118 P.2d 780 (1941); Watkins v. Dorris, 24. Wash.
636, 64 Pac. 840 (1901).
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sec. 1, declaring the ownership of the beds of navigable waters to be

in the state."8 It would probably follow from this language that a
stream is not navigable for title merely because it is large enough to

be used, and has been used, for floating pleasure craft such as rowboats and canoes.
To summarize: The test for determining title requires that a river
must have, during fairly regular periods each year, both the capacity
and location for reasonable use as a carrier of commercial products
other than merely logs.
Streams: Navigability for Public Use. The test for determining the
right of public use on streams is more liberal, i.e., it covers more water.
A stream is navigable if it is capable, by reason of location and size,
of being commercially useful for the carrying of logs.9" Under the
present state of the law, capacity for carrying pleasure craft, such as
rowboats and canoes, is not enough to make a river navigable for
public use. This subject will be discussed infra.
RIPARIAN RIGHT S IN NAVIGABLE

(FoR TITLE) WATERS

OF WASHINGTON -

Starting with Eisenback v. Hatfield,1 decided in 1891, there are
many Washington cases that say ihere are no riparian rights to
navigable (for title) waters in this state. 2 However, a close examination of these and other cases indicates that this statement, standing
alone, is much too broad. What is really meant is that there are no
riparian rights as against the state or persons claiming under it.
89 11 Wn2d

at 137, 118 P2d at 782.

90 Strand v. State, 16 Wn.2d 107, 132 P.2d 1011 (1943) ; Monroe Mill Co. v. Menzel,

35 Wash. 487, 77 Pac. 813 (1904) ; Watkins v. Dorris, 24 Wash. 636, 64 Pac. 840
(1901). In the Watkins case the court said: "If the stream is not meandered, it must
then be determined whether it is or is not navigable in fact for floating logs or timber.
If navigable for such purpose, it is a public highway for this purpose." 24 Wash. at
644, 64 Pac. at 843.
912 Wash. 236, 26 Pac. 539 (1891).
92 See for example: Port of Seattle v. Oregon & W.R.R., 255 U.S. 56 (1921);
Hill v. Newell, 86 Wash. 227, 149 Pac. 951 (1915) ; State ex rel. Ham, Yearsley &
Ryrie v. Superior Court, 70 Wash. 442, 126 Pac. 945 (1912); Lownsdale v. Grays
Harbor Boom Co., 54 Wash.'542, 103 Pac. 833 (1909); Grays Harbor Boom Co. v.
Lownsdale, 54 Wash. 83, 102 Pac. 1041, 104 Pac. 267 (1909) ; Brace & Hergert Mill
Co. v. State, 49 Wash. 326, 95 Pac. 278 (1908). Additional cases in this state on the
question of riparian rights in navigable waters are: Newell v. Loeb, 77 Wash. 182,
137 Pac. 811 (1913) ; State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 135 Pac. 1035 (1913) ; Bilger
v. State, 63 Wash. 457, 116 Pac. 19 (1911) ; Northern Pac. Ry. v. Slade Lumber Co.,
61 Wash. 195, 112 Pac. 240 (1910) ; Hulet v. Wishkah Boom Co., 54 Wash. 510, 103
Pac. 814 (1909) ; Van Siclen v. Muir, 46 Wash. 38, 89 Pac. 188 (1907) ; Madson v.
Spokane Valley Land & Water Co., 40 Wash. 414, 82 Pac. 718 (1905) ; New Whatcom
v. Fairhaven Land Co., 24 Wash. 493, 64 Pac. 735 (1901); West Coast Improvement
Co. v. Winsor, 8 Wash. 490, 36 Pac. 441 (1894)..
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The majority of jurisdictions,93 including a majority of those in the
western part of the United States, 4 recognize some riparian rights in
navigable waters. The California and Texas courts recognize such
rights as long as they are not inconsistent with the public easement.9 5
Each state may, of course, adopt whatever rule it deems appropriate."
In Washington the holding of the Hatfield case was based primarily
upon a provision in the Washington constitution which states: "The
state of Washington asserts its ownership to the beds and shores of all
navigable waters in the state, up to and including the line of ordinary
high tide, in the waters where the tide ebbs and flows, and up to and
including the line of ordinary high water within the banks of all
navigable rivers and lakes."97 The plaintiff riparian sought by injunction to require defendant to remove certain wharves from the state
tideland (on navigable waters) in front of plaintiff's property. The
location of the wharves had been approved by state legislation. The
court refused to order their removal, saying: "[R]iparian proprietors
on the shore of the navigable waters of the state have no special or
peculiar rights therein as an incident to their estate. To hold otherwise would be to deny the power of the state to deal with its own
property as it may deem best for the public good."98 The holding is
founded upon the idea that the state owns the navigable waters within
its borders, and the lands underlying them, and thus has full right to
control these areas. Riparians have no right to build wharves or other
structures on the surface or bed of navigable waters without the consent of the state. They have no vested right to future accretions. 9
They have no common law right to appropriate water superior to the
appropriative rights of nonriparians whose rights were acquired under
the state water code.1"' This is true even though the riparian land in
93 Port

of Seattle v. Oregon & W.R.R., 255 U.S. 56 (1921) ; WIEL, WATER RIGHTS
§§ 904-06 (3d ed. 1911).
94 HUTCHINS, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST, 37 (1942). "The states which
recognize the riparian doctrine so far as nonnavigable waters are concerned are not
uniform in extending that doctrine to the use of the waters of navigable streams for
irrigation purposes, but the weight of authority in such western jurisdictions seems to
be in favor of applying the rule to navigable water."
95 California: Miller & Lux, Inc., v. San Joaquin Light & Power Corp., 120 Cal.
App. 589, 8 P.2d 560 (1932) ; Heilbron v. Fowler Switch Canal Co., 75 Cal. 426, 17
Pac. 535 (1888).
Texas: Motl v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 286 S.W. 458 (1926) ; Barrett v. Metcalfe, 12
Tex. Civ. App. 247, 33 S.W. 758 (1896).
96 Port of Seattle v. Oregon & W.R.R., 255 U.S. 56 (1921).
97 WASH. CONST. art. 17, § 1 (1889).
98 Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. 236, 253, 26 Pac. 539, 543 (1891).
99 Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. 236, 26 Pac. 539 (1891).
100 State ex rel. Ham, Yearsley & Ryrie v. Superior Court, 70 Wash. 442, 126 Pac.
945 (1912).
IN THE WESTERN STATES
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question was acquired by patent from the United States prior to the
adoption of the constitution.' ° ' They cannot -even complain if the
state, or someone acting by its authority, totally deprives them of
access to navigable waters, e.g., by diverting the water away from the
riparian land."0 2 And they have no right to interfere with fishing by
a member of the public in the water opposite their shores. 3
Care should be taken to note that most of the limitations on riparian
rights in navigable waters extend only in favor of the state, or someone
acting under its authority. 'In Eisenbach v. Hatfield the court said
that the plaintiff riparian could not object to defendant's use of the
tidelands in front of plaintiff's land where that use was pursuant to
statutory authority. The court then added that the defendant could
not enlarge upon his use of the land unless he acquired additional
authority and title from the state. In West Coast Improvement Co. v.
Winsor ° the court held that a riparian could enjoin as a trespass the
driving of piling on the tideland in front of his land where the "trespasser" was not acting under any authority from the state. The court
said that the Eisenbach rule did not decide the question of loss of
riparian rights as to anyone except the state or someone claiming
through it.' The holding of the Winsor case was affirmed in Van Siclen
v. Muir °0 where the court said that the riparian right in question was
the result of the preference right in the riparian to purchase the shoreland in front of his land when it was placed up for sale.
There are some cases that seem to go even a step further in protecting riparian rights to navigable waters-even as against someone
acting under state authority. In Northern Pac. Ry. v. Slade Lumber
Co.' °7 the court said that a riparian who had purchased the tidelands
101 Id.
102 So complete is the absence of riparian rights on navigable waters as to the state
and those claiming under it that a navigable stream may be completely diverted, so that
the water no longer contacts the riparian land, and the riparian cannot complain. Hill
v. Newell, 86 Wash. 227, 149 Pac. 951 (1915) ; Newell v. Loeb, 77 Wash. 182, 137 Pac.
811 (1913). These cases were commented upon in Port of Seattle v. Oregon & W.R.P.,

255 U.S. 56 (1921).

103 Kemp v. Putnam, 47 Wn2d 530, 288 P.2d 837 (195.).

304 8 Wash. 490, 36 Pac. 441 (1891).
105 Id. at 493, 36 Pac. at 442. In speaking of the Eisenbach case the court said: "That
case, however, did not go to the extent of holding that an upland proprietor had no
interest in the tide land in front of him, except as against the state, and the question
as to what would be his rights as against one not claiming under the state has not been
passed upon, so far as we are advised, by this court." The court went on to say that

it was not necessary to pass directly on that issue in this case because the preference
right which the legislature had enacted into law implicity gave the riparian on navi-

gable waters a right to exclude trespassers from the area that he might later purchase.
06 46 Wash. 38, 89 Pac. 188 (1907).
107 61 Wash. 195, 112 Pac. 240 (1910). This rule was also stated in State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 135 Pac. 1035 (1913).
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in front of his property, and had constructed a wharf abutting on the
navigable portion of the river, had a right of access to that water as
against the owner of a drawbridge operating under both state and
federal authority who claimed that the ships tied to defendant's docks
impaired the operation of the bridge. The court said that if plaintiff
drawbridge owner had a right to require removal of ships from defendant's wharf in order for the drawbridge to operate there was no
reason why someone in another situation might not totally destroy a
riparian's access to navigable waters. The court refused to accept such
a rule. In Hulet v. Wislkah Boom Co.' the plaintiff established that
the defendant's log floating operation occasionally caused the river in
front of plaintiff's land to be completely blocked by log jams. In addition, the artificial freshets released by defendant from his splash dams
to better float the logs caused the deposit on plaintiff's riparian land
of numbers of logs, and caused the washing away of about an acre of
plaintiff's farm. The supreme court affirmed a trial court injunction
requiring that defendant refrain from so operating its splash dams and
boom as to obstruct navigation and injure plaintiff's lands. The theory
of the decision was that defendant's conduct constituted a public
nuisance, and that plaintiff was a person specially injured by this
nuisance. It is true that the defendant did not own the tidelands under
the navigable waters in question (he did have federal authority to use
the river) nevertheless the court took pains to point out that the result
would not be changed if the defendant were to acquire title to these
lands from the state. The case would appar to raise navigable-waterriparians to a position considerably above the "no right" status.
Lastly, there is the case of New Whatcom v. FairhavenLand Co."°9
where the court held that a riparian on a nonnavigable outlet of a
navigable lake did have riparian rights, and could enjoin the taking of
water from the lake where such taking deprived him of water for the
operation of his sawmill. Similarly, in Madson v. Spokane Valley Land
& Water Co." ° the court held that a riparian who owned the land
under a nonnavigable arm of a navigable lake had a riparian right of
access to that arm which justified an injunction against another who
put up a dam that dried it up.
By way of summary it may be said that the court has effectively
restricted private riparian rights on navigable waters where those
108 54 Wash. 510, 103 Pac. 814 (1909).
109 24 Wash. 493, 64 Pac. 735 (1909).
110 40 Wash. 414, 82 Pac. 718 (1905).
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rights are in conflict with the constitutional power of the state to control such waters. The constitution does not purport to eliminate riparian
rights as between individuals, and the court has not so construed it.
RIPARIAN RIGHTS ON NONNAVIGABLE (FOR TITLE) WATERS
(NOT IN CONFLICT WITH APPROPRIATE RIGHTS)

Riparian Rights on Nonnavigable Lakes. Five cases decided in
the past five years, in Florida,"1 Minnesota,"', Arkansas,"' Michigan," 4 and Washington,"' reflect a distinct trend". in the direction
of wider public use of the nonnavigable lakes in the United States. The
beds of all of these lakes were privately owned by riparians. However
in each case the court held that all of the riparians had a common right
to the use of the whole surface, and not merely the portion over his
own land. The Washington case that falls within this group is Snively
v. Jaber."7 It is one of the few cases in this state dealing with riparian
rights to a nonnavigable lake" where there was no conflict with appropriators. It arose out of a long standing dispute about the use of Angle
Lake, which is located just south of Seattle. The plaintiffs were owners
of riparian land, part of which was being used for a homesite and part
of which was being subdivided'into residential lots for sale. Defendant
operated a summer resort with a dance hall, picnic grounds; swimming
area, and rental boats. The resort operation began in 1919; plaintiffs
acquired their land in 1926. Plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction
against the use by defendant's'patrons of that part of the lake-overlying
plaintiffs' land. Plaintiffs complained that the patrons (1) operated
boats on the water over his portion of the lake, and (2) used defendant's
boats to land on and litter plaintiffs' shores. Plaintiffs also claimed that
defendant's rafts were anchored to plaintiffs' portion of the bottom of
the lake. The trial court enjoined as a nuisance the renting of boats by
'1Duval v. Thomas, 114 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1959).
".2 Johnson v. Seifert, 100 N.W2d 689 (Minn. 1960).
11 Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955).
11 Kerley v. Wolfe, 349 Mich. 350, 84 N.W.2d 748 (1957).
"' Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wn2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956).

116 In 1952 a tabulation of states that had decided one way or another on the question

of whether a riparian on a lake has an exclusive right to the water over his land showed
that ten states held for the exclusive right, and only three held for the right of common
usage by all riparians. See 5 F.
L. Ray. 166 (1952). Washington, Arkansas, and
Florida had not decided the question in 1952. Minnesota had decided it in favor of the
exclusive right position, and then, in the case cited above, reversed that position.
Michigan, in the above case, reaffirmed and clarified its prior holding in favor of
common use by all riparians.
1"7 48 Wn.2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 .(1956).
118 Angle Lake had previously been held nonnavigable in Snively v. State, 167 Wash.
385, 9 P.2d 773 (1932).
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defendant for a period of two years, on the showing that by then
probably all of plaintiffs' subdivided land would be sold and improved.
and that defendant's patrons did not seem to land on, or litter, the
occupied property on the lake. The court refused to issue a permanent
injunction against the use of plaintiffs' portion of either the surface or
bed of the lake by other riparians or their licensees (defendant's
patrons). The supreme court affirmed. Other than a general reference
to the limitations placed on riparian rights by the 1917 water code,...
the opinion appears to be based on the ground of economic and social
necessity. In answering the plaintiffs' contention that they should have
the right of exclusive possession of the water over their portion of the
lake bottom the court aptly pointed out:
The adoption of the rule urged by the plaintiffs would in effect destroy
all of the rights of riparian owners in nonnavigable lakes except the
right of appropriation. What practical value would the vested rights
rights
to boat, swim, fish, and bathe, have to any riparian owner if such
12
were restricted to his fenced-in pie-shaped portion of the lake ?
The court then held:
[W]ith respect to the boating, swimming, fishing, and other similar
rights of riparian proprietors upon a nonnavigable lake, these rights or
privileges are owned in common, and that any proprietor or his licensee
may use the entire surface of a lake so long as he does not unreasonably
interfere with the exercise of similar rights by the other owners. This
rule does not have the effect of making the nonnavigable lake public,
since the stranger has no right to enter upon the lake without the permission of an abutting owner. The rule we have announced affords
equal protection to the interest of all riparian owners in the use of the
water and seeks to promote the greatest
beneficial use by each with a
1 21
minimum of harm to other owners.

The Minnesota Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in
Johnson v. Seifert,"' holding that a riparian on a nonnavigable lake
was entitled to an injunction against another riparian to require the
removal of a fence the other had constructed on his property line
through the lake. In so holding the court expressly overruled a prior
1"i The court cited RCW 90.04.020 of the appropriation code as "a recognition by
the legislature of the limitation upon the common-law right of riparian owners." One
may question the relevance of this argument in a case involving only riparians against
each other, and not raising any question of riparian vs. appropriator.
120 48 Wn.2d at 821. 296 P.2d at 1019 (1956).
121 Id. at 821-22, 296 P.2d at 1019 (1956).
122 100 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. 1960).
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contrary decision. 12 3 As in Washington the ruling appeared to be
based on the ground of economic necessity. 2"
In the Florida case of Duval v. Thomas, 2 " the plaintiff riparian
sought an injunction-to require two other riparians to remove dikes
they had placed along their boundary lines in a nonnavigable lake.
The dikes restricted plaintiff to a small portion of the surface. The
court granted the injunction, again relying largely on economic, rather
than "property right" grounds. Special recognition was given the value
of tourism in Florida, the court saying:
We take judicial knowledge of the importance of "tourism" to our
state. Florida is advertised as a playground, a retreat from the hurryscurry of the modern world and from the rigors of northern clime.
Fishing and swimming are prominent if not principal items of the entertainment the stranger expects to find here. If the enjoyment of nonnavigable lakes were to be curtailed or restricted by a holding that the
owner of a portion of one of them, and his guests, should enjoy
the waters only
within the property lines the damage would be im28
measurable.3
In the Michigan case of Kerley v. Wolfe, 27 the court decided that a
riparian could not fence along his property line where such a fence
would stop boat traffic from going through a narrow neck of a nonnavigable lake. And in the Arkansas case of Harris v. Brooks2 8 the
court said that a riparian was making an "unreasonable" use of the
waters of a nonnavigable lake and could be enjoined by other riparians
when he pumped water out in sufficient quantities to make the lake
unsuitable for fishing, recreation, and other lawful purposes. 9
In the Washington case the underwater boundary lines had not been
surveyed and were not known at the time of the decision. Because of
this it was urged in a subsequent case that the rule of common use
applied only where the boundaries were not known. However the court
said this was not the basis of the Snively case and that the common
right of use exists whether or not the boundaries are fully known.'
Lamprey v. Danz, 86 Minn.317, 90 N.W. 578 (1902).
124 Johnson v. Seifert, 100 N.W.2d 689, 695 (Minn. 1960).
125 114 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1959).
12 Id.at 795.
127 349 Mich. 350, 84 N.W2d 748 (1957).
128 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955).
129 See also Johnson v. Seifert, 100 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. 1960).
1.0 Judd v. Bernard, 49 Wn.2d 619, 304 P.2d 1046 (1956). The question involved
was whether the representatives of the State Game Department could go upon a nonnavigable lake and poison the fish, as a part of its game mangement program. The court
said yes. "The appellants further contend that the representatives of the game commission have no right to go on those portions of the lake under which they own title
123
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Although this issue is not expressly raised in the cases from the other
states it seems clear from their facts that the same rule applies there.
The Washington case-recognizing a common right of use of the
surface-is one of the few such cases which also goes on to find, and
enjoin, an abuse of that right. The Snively case held that the public's
use of defendant's boats to litter the shores of other riparians was a
"nuisance" and thus enjoinable. The nuisance theory as expressed here
would seem to be closely analogous, if not identical, to the "reasonable
use" theory which has historically controlled riparian uses in the face
of conflicting rights. Under that theory a riparian can make any use
of the water that is not unreasonable as to other riparians."'3

Thus in

the Arkansas case noted above the court held that a riparian had a
right to pump water from a lake, but not to the extent that it substantially impaired other riparian uses of the surface for fishing and boating. To do so was "unreasonable" and enjoinable. Presumably in
Washington the "nuisance" idea will be used wherever appropriate to
control the common right of use of such lakes. One problem in this
area-raised but not decided in the Snively case-was whether one
riparian can permanently anchor a dock or other object in the water
over another's land. In that case the plaintiff argued that defendant's
dock was anchored over plaintiff's portion of the lake bed, and should
be ordered removed. The court declined to so order because the boundary lines were not known and it could not be sure on whose land the
dock was anchored. If the boundaries had been known it would seem
that the court might properly have ordered removal on the ground that
the maintenance at that location was a "nuisance," or an "unreasonable" use. Such conduct would not seem to be a trespass; if it were,
then even the anchoring of a fishing skiff for a few moments would
also seem to be one. Such a result would be antithetical to the purpose
of the common use rule.
In four of the five jurisdictions named above the ruling in favor of
common riparian use was new. (The case from Michigan was a clarification of an earlier rule.) In Minnesota the court had to overrule
expressly a previous decision to apply this rule. In Florida the court
to the bed. They attempt to distinguish Snively v. Jaber... holding that riparian
owners enjoy such rights as boating, fishing, and swimming in common, on the ground
that the boundaries of their portions of the lake bed have been determined; whereas,
no such determination had been made in that case. The holding in that case regarding
the right to use the surface of the lake was not based upon the fact that the lake bed
boundaries had not been determined, but on the reasoning that these riparian rights, if
not enjoyed and exercised in common, cannot be enjoyed or exercised at all." 49 Wn.2d
619, 621, 340 P.2d 1046, 1049 (1956).
131 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, Ch. 41, Topic 3, Scope Note (1939).
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said that the common law rule was "ambiguous" and thus it could, and
would exercise its discretion and adopt the rule of common sense. In
the Arkansas case the principal issue was whether the pumping of
water from the lake was a "reasonable" use. the court more or less
assumed that each riparian had a common right to the use of the surface of the lake with others. In Washington the court had to overcome the logic of an early case, Griffith v. Holman,' defining riparian
rights on nonnavigable streams, where it was said that riparians had
an exclusive right of fishery in the stream flowing across their land.
In distinguishing the Griffith case the court used two arguments, saying (1) "the holding has no application in a case involving a large
lake surrounded by many riparian owners," ' and (2) the Griffith
case was "justified" by a "fencing" statute3 that applied only to nonnavigable, nonmeandered streams. By distinguishing the Griffith case
the court has suggested that there are two sets of rules concerning
riparian rights, one for nonnavigable lakes, and another for nonnavigable streams. The Snively case purports to define those rights only
for lakes. So far as the language of Snively is concerned we are pushed
back to Griffith v. Holman for our most direct statement of riparian
rights to nonnavigable streams. This subject will be discussed infra.
One of the most significant portions of the Snively opinion is that
which says that the "licensees" of riparians can use the surface of the
lake in common with other riparians. None of the. other cases noted
above directly raised this issue, although certainly the implication is
abundantly clear in the Florida case that patrons of a resort can use
the lake in common with others. 5 In the Washington case the term
"licensee" was used to include (1) friends and acquaintances of riparians using the-lake with the permission of the property owner, and
(2) patrons of a summer resort. 8 Who else might be licensees? What
about the public where a state road touches a lake? In the past few
years the Washington State Department of Game has instituted a campaigu to acquire many public access roads to nonnavigable lakes of
.32 23 Wash. 347, 63 Pac. 239 (1900).
233 Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wn.2d 815, 820, 296 P.2d 1015, 1019 (1956).
1s4 RCW 90.28.160. "The owner or occupant of land may fence across an unmeandered stream which is not used as a public highway, if the fence'does not obstruct the
flow of the stream." WAsH. SESS. LAws 1891 c. 120 § 3. This statue, and the Griffith
case, will be discussed later in this article.
185 The court said. that "If the enjoyment of nonnavigable lakes were to be curtailed
or restricted by a holding that the owner of a portion of one of them, and his guests,
should enjoy the waters only within the property lines the damage would be immeasurable." 114 So. 2d at 795.
13 Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wn.2d 815, at 821, 822, 296 P.2d 1015, 1019 (1956).
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the state."' Anyone, whether or not a citizen of the state, is invited
to use these roads. Sometimes the state acquires title to the road area,
and sometimes merely an easement. If it has title then under the reasoning of the Snively case the members of the public would seem
clearly to be "licensees." If it has merely an easement then they would
probably still be licensees, although there would seem to be some question whether the state in such a case is a riparian." 8 Still another
question is presented in the case of a regular state highway that happens to touch on a lake. To be a licensee presumably the access area
must be used with the consent of the riparian owner. Whether the
state has consented to the use of a particular highway as an access
road would seem to depend on the circumstances of each case." 9 Certainly the state would have the right to either give, or deny, its consent
to the use of its roads for this purpose.
It might be suggested that when the state acquires a riparian road
all the citizens of the state thereby become riparians and have a right
to use the waters of the lake in common with others. 40 For a number
of reasons it seems unlikely that a court would stretch the term "riparian" that far.'
Riparian Rights on Nonnavigable Streams. There have not been
as many cases in recent years on the public right to use "nonnavigable" (for title) streams in the United States as there have been on
the right to use nonnavigable lakes. Two such cases, however, deserve
137 The records of the State of Washington Department of Game show that the state
has acquired 229 areas on 221 lakes for purposes of public access. 169 of these areas
are presently developed. The total amount of land under state control for access purposes is 5,804.42 acres.
138 It has been said that "generally the person entitled to the exclusive right to possess and use riparian land, although he does not own the fee, is entitled to enjoy the
riparian rights incident to the land." 56 AM. JUR., WATERS, § 283 (1947). See also
93 C.J.S. WATERS § 8 (1956). If this rule were to apply in Washington then the state
would appear to be a riparian where it has an easement for highway purposes. Such
easements give the state an exclusive right of possession. They are distinguished from
the easement a person might acquire across another's land to be used in common with
the landowner. For an additional case on this question see: Village of Pewaukee v.
Savoy, 103 Wis. 271, 79 N.W. 436 (1899). In Washington it has been held that a
settler on the federal domain has riparian rights from the date of his settlement (taking
possession with intent to homestead) and not merely from the date of issuance of his
patent. Sander v. Bull, 76 Wash. 1, 135 Pac. 489 (1913). See also Benton v. Johncox,
17 Wash. 277, 49 Pac. 495 (1897).
139 Unless a statute is enacted defining the manner in which the state can designate
which roads are to be used by the public for access and which are not, then it would
seem that the state's intentions could be gleaned from any one of a number of sources.
Probably in most cases that intention would be known through rulings or statements
of the State Department of Game, or through state acquiescence.
140 This theory was recently suggested as the basis for the public right to use state
lakes by the Director of the Washington State Department of Game in a letter to the

author. See 56 Am.

JUR., WATERS.

§ 280 (1947).

Some of the reasons why such a holding seems unlikely are: (1) the few authorities on the related question of whether the citizens of a city all become riparians when
141
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special note, Elder v. Delcour,'4 2 and State v. Red River Valley Co." 3

These cases indicate a slight, but visible trend toward recognition of
greater public use in such waters. The Elder case has probably gone
as far as any other in the direction of recognizing and protecting the
public right of use. There the Missouri Supreme Court held that a
member of the public was not a trespasser where he (1) pressed down
the riparian's fence across a nonnavigable stream, (2) took his canoe
across the fence, (3) floated in the canoe across the riparian's land,
(4) carried the canoe on the bank around a log jam, (5) then waded
down the bed of the stream to fish before re-embarking in the canoe
and leaving the land of the riparian. One of the primary bases of the
opinion was a series of declarations contained in federal legislation,"4
and the Missouri constitution, 45 to the effect that "the Mississippi and
Missouri Rivers, and the navigable waters flowing into them, and the
carrying places between the same, shall be common highways and
forever free to the people of the said territory-and to the citizens of
the United States without any tax, duty or impost therefor.""" The
court said that the title to the bed of the stream in question was acquired subject to these pronouncements, and thus the public had an
easement over it.
The New Mexico case 4 ' took a different approach in arriving at
about the same point, i.e., that the public have a right to fish in a pria stream runs through a city, and touches city property, seem to indicate that the citi-

zens are not riparians. A city through which a stream flows normally has no riparian
right unless it owns property abutting on the stream. Town of Antioch v. Williams
Irr. Dist., 188 Cal. 451, 205 Pac. 688 (1922). In that event it may put the water of the
stream to beneficial uses upon the tract owned to the same extent as any private riparian. Appeal of Haupt, 125 Pa. St 211, 17 Atl. 436 (1889). Water may not, however,
be diverted for public service supply. Town of Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19
S.E.2d 700 (1942). Contra, City of Canton v. Shock, 66 Ohio St. 19, 63 N.E. 600
(1902). See also WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES § 723 (3d ed. 1911)
and 56 Am. JuR., WATERS § 283 (1947). For cases on related topics in Washington see
City of New Whatcom v. Fairhaven Land Co., 24 Wash. 493, 64 Pac. 735 (1901) and
Rigney v. Tacoma Light & Water Co., 9 Wash. 245, 37 Pac. 297 (1894). (2) the whole
notion of riparianism-that riparians will share reasonably in the use of the watermight be placed in jeopardy by such a rule. In many instances the use of a body of
water by a fair sized segment of the state's citizens could destroy the value of the water.
Furthermore, if the citizens of the state all became riparians by this reasoning, then the
citizens of the United States would all become riparians when that government acquires
riparian land! (3) if the public can claim to be riparians as to these roads as to other
riparians, can they not also make such a claim as against the state?
142 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954).
143 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945).
1442 STAT.743, 747 (15) (1812).
145 Mo. CoNST. art. I (1875).
146 2 STAT. 743, 747 (15) (1812).
147 State v. Red River Valley Co., supra note 143. The statement on riparian and
public rights to nonnavigable streams of the state was dicta, The issue in the case was
whether the public had a right to fish in a portion of a reservoir where the bed was
privately owned.
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vately owned stream. The basis for this case was said to be a constitutional provision14 8 that "the unappropriated water of every natural
stream... within the state of New Mexico, is hereby declared to belong to the public and to be subject to appropriation for beneficial use."
Inasmuch as the water belonged to the public, the court said the public had a right to fish in it, in spite of the fact that the bed was
privately owned.
A recent case holding contrary to the above is Boerner v. McCallister,4 ' where the Virginia Supreme Court held that a riparian who
owned the bed of a nonnavigable stream also had the exclusive right
to fish in it. This decision, however, is based essentially upon the
terms of an early grant, by which the riparian's predecessors took
from King George II certain lands and "the rivers, waters and water
courses therein contained, together with the privilege of hunting...
fishing... ."
Other jurisdictions are split on the question of the public right to
use nonnavigable, privately owned streams. 5 °
In Washington the case of Griffith v. Holman, 5 ' decided in 1900, is
one of the few cases dealing directly with this question. There the
plaintiff riparian sued in trespass alleging that defendant, a fisherman,
(1) cut the wire fence that plaintiff had placed across the Little Spokane River at the border to his property, and (2) caught plaintiff's
fish while floating across the property in a boat. The trial court
awarded plaintiff $250 damages on each of these charges and the
supreme court affirmed. Among other things the supreme court held
that the plaintiff had a right to fence the stream. The decision was
apparently 5 . based on a "fencing" statute, still in existence,'5 3 which
provides: "Fencing across streams. The owner or occupant of land
may fence across an unmeandered stream which is not used as a pub148 N.M. CONST. art. XVI
14' 197 Va. 169, 89 S.E.2d

§ 2.
23 (1955).
150 Cases holding for a right of public use are: Attorney General v. Woods, 108
Mass. 436 (1871) ; Collins v. Gerhardt, 237 Mich. 38, 211 N.W. 115 (1926) ; State v.
Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945) ; People v. Kraemer, 7 Misc.
2d 363, 164 N.Y.S.2d 423 (1957) ; Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261,
145 N.W. 816 (1914) ; Willow River Club v. Wade, 100 Wis. 86, 76 N.W. 273 (1898).
Contra: Hood v. Murphy, 231 Ala. 408, 165 So. 219 (1936) ; Hartman v. Tresise, 36
Colo. 146, 84 Pac. 685 (1905). Analysis of the various cases on this subject may be
found in 12 Wyo. L.J. 167 (1958) ;33 N.Y.U. L. REv. 229 (1958) ; 42 VA. L. REv. 121
(1956) : 35 ORE. L. REv. 237 (1956) ;and Note, 47 A.L.R. 2d 381 (1956).
15123 Wash. 347, 63 Pac. 239 (1900).
152The fencing statute does not appear in the Griffith opinion. However, in the
recent case of Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wn.2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956), the court said this
statute was the justification of the Grilfith case.
153 RCW 90.28.160. "Fencing across streams. The owner or occupant of land may
fence across an unmeandered stream which is not used as a public highway, if the fence
does not obstruct the flow of the street." WASH. SEss. LAWS 1891 c. 120, § 3.
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lic highway, if the fence does not obstruct the flow of the stream."
It would seem, however, that-this statute is at best only permissive,
and that it would not give to riparians any greater rights against third
parties than they had before its enactment.
Other aspects of the Griffith decision tend to make it suspect.- A'
substantial portion of the opinion was taken up with a discussion of
the ownership of fish. The court said they belonged exclusively to
plaintiff, and that plaintff had ,an exclusive right of fishery in such
waters. The court further said that this is true even on navigable
watets-a proposition patently incorrect, and completely rejected since
then. " ' It is also clear in this state, as in others,..5 that fish found in
nonnavigable as well as navigable waters are not only subject to state
control, but belong to the state. 5 ' The only part of the Griffith rule
that has not been changed in subsequent opinions-probably because
it has not come up for decision-is the holding that a riparian has an
exclusive right of fishery over his land.
The, Griffith case appears to be the only one in the state dealing
directly with the matter of riparian rights to nonnavigable streams as
against the boating public. There is, however, a group of cases' 57 on
a closely related subject which shed some light on this question. Typical of these cases is Watkins v. Dorris. s There the court was concerned with the right of a logger to float his logs down a nonnavigable
stream over plaintiff's riparian land. An 1890 statute provided: 55
"All meandered rivers, meandered sloughs and navigable waters in
this state shall be deemed as public highways... for the purpose of
this act." The court said this statute meant that one could float logs
down a "navigable stream"' even though it was not meandered. The
court also said that a stream is navigable for log floating if it is commercially usable for that purpose. This is not to say, however, that
navigability for this purpose also makes it navigable for title determination. In fact in the Watkins case the court held that the creek in
154 Kemp v. Putnam, 47 Wn.2d 530, 288 P.2d 837 (1955).
155 3 C.J.S. Ani,nals § 5 (1936).

250 Judd v. Bernard, 49 Wn.2d 619, 304 P.2d 1046 (1956).
357 Peterson v. Arland, 79 Wash. 679, 141 Pac. 63 (1914) ; Wilson v. Prickett, 79
Wash. 89, 139 Pac. 754 (1914) ; Fortson Shingle Co. v. Skagland, 77 Wash. 8, 137 Pac.
304 (1913) ; Summer Lumber and Shingle Co. v. Pacific Coast Power Co., 72 Wash.
631, 131 Pac. 220 (1913) ; Kuhnis v. Lewis River Boom and Logging Co., 51 Wash.
196, 98 Pac. 655 (1908) ; White v. Codd, 39 Wash. 14, 80 Pac. 836 (1905) ; Matthews
v. Belfast Manufacturing Co., 35 Wash. 662, 77 Pac. 1046 (1904) ; Monroe Mill Co. v.
Menzel, 35 Wash. 487, 77 Pac. 813 (1904) ; Ingram v. Wishkah Boom Co., 35 Wash.
191, 77 Pac. 34 (1904) ; Watkins v. Dorris, 24 Wash. 636, 64 Pac. 840 (1901); East

Hoquiam Boom &,Logging Co. v. Neeson, 20 Wash. 142, 54 Pac. 1001 (1898).
'15 24 Wash. 636. 64 Pac. 840 (1901).
159

RCW 76.28.090.
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question was nonnavigable for title, but navigable for log floating.
In a subsequent case.. the court explained some of the limitations
on the right of one floating logs across another's land, holding that the
log driver must confine his operations to the bed of the stream, and
has no right to use the banks.
How does the Watkins v. Dorris line of cases mesh with the ruling
in Griffith v. Holman? The Griffith case appears to have been laid
under the theory of trespass to real property. The court said that the
"right of fishery" in the riparian owner "is absolute." In Watkins v.
Dorris the court held that a member of the public had a right to float
logs across another's land, pursuant to an 1890 statute. The statute
in this case, however, would seem to make no difference to the really
important question, i.e., was the log floating a trespass, or a taking of
private property for which compensation must be paid? It would seem
clearly not. There are few absolute rules in the riparian system. It
certainly cannot be said that there is a universally recognized exclusive right to the use and possession of water flowing across one's land.
Whether such a right, or any particular riparian right, exists in a given
case depends upon the social and economic needs involved.'
The
need to support logging operations in this state is great, and so we
find the result in the Watkins line of cases. We saw a similar approach
on the matter of riparian rights to nonnavigable lakes in Snively v.
Jaber.
What would be the rule today with regard to the public right of
boating and fishing on the nonnavigable rivers and streams of the
160 Monroe Mill Co. v. Menzel, 35 Wash. 487, 77 Pac. 813 (1904). See also: Summer
Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Pacific Coast Power Co., 72 Wash. 631, 131 Pac. 220 (1913).
161 This principle has been recognized in Washington in a number of cases, typical
of which is Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wn.2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956), and Monroe Mill
Co. v. Menzel, 35 Wash. 487, 77 Pac. 813 (1904). In the Monroe case the court said:
"The reasons leading to the holding in this state and others, where the timber industry is
important, that streams which are navigable in fact for the floatage of timber to market
shall be public highways for that purpose, are founded upon commercial convenience
and necessity, because of the environment of the industry. Much of the timber grows
in the mountains, also upon the foothills, and in other localities which are inaccessible
by means of transportation facilities, without great expense. Nature has, however, provided numerous streams which flow out of these timber centers, and which are available
highways for the carriage of the timber to market. In a locality so situated, it seems
reasonable that these highways should be used for such purposes. It is true, the majority
of these streams, being unmeandered, pass over private property, and their beds are
owned by the adjacent land owner. But the lands are naturally burdened, if it be a
burden, by the streams themselves, with their defined banks and flowing water, and it
is not an additional burden to the land owner for the timber product to float along with
the already running water, provided it is so done as not to damage his land." 35 Wash.
487, 495, 77 Pac. 813, 815 (1909).
162 According to the records of the State of Washington Department of Game the
state now owns or controls 189.9 miles of streambank on 41 different streams for the
use of fishermen. It also controls an additional 867.06 acres of land for the purpose of
boat launching sites, parking, etc.
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state? Would the court adhere to the ill-formed rule of Griffith v.
Holman, or would it recognize the increasing social and economic need
that these waters be held for wide public recreational purposes'6 2 and
apply a rule such as that of Snively v. Jaber? The latter rule would
seem to be in conformity not only with the state's needs, but also with
the long standing custom and practice with regard to the use of our
rivers and streams.
CONCLUSION

New demands on our available water resources are being made at
a very fast pace. We are now in a time when the "multiple use" concept, which is being applied widely to the control of our timber lands,
will have to be applied extensively to the control of our water resources. In the early history of the state the principal economic use
of the lakes and streams was for irrigation. That use is still dominant
in some locales, however, in many areas other uses, such as for recreation and homesites, have crowded into the foreground, and are
insisting upon greater legal recognition. In some ways the law has'
reflected this changing picture. Following the adoption of the water
code in 1917,12 and the decision in Brown v. Chase6 ' in 1923, it appeared that the appropriation system was gaining clear superiority in
those areas where it conflicted with riparianism. It now appears that
the Brown case was probably the high-water mark of the appropriation
system. In 1929 the supreme court decided In re Martha Lake Water
Co."65
' and in 1950 In re Clinton Water District,'66 two cases limiting
appropriations that would have encroached upon recreational and
homesite uses of nonnavigable lakes. We do not yet know what the
court might do under similar circumstances with regard to the nonnavigable streams of the state, although it would seem unlikely that
appropriative rights would be as strictly limited there in view of the
much greater dependence of irrigation on stream waters. In any event
it may be observed that the constantly changing nature of water uses
seems to be encouraging our court in (1) holding the line on further
expansion of the appropriation system, and (2) applying wherever
appropriate the more viable principles of riparianism.
The trend in the direction of greater protection for recreational uses
-63 RCW 90.

164 125 Wash. 542, 217 Pac. 23 (1923).
165 152 Wash. 53, 277
166 36 Wn.2d 284, 218
167 48 Wn.2d 815, 296

Pac. 382 (1929).
P.2d 309 (1950).

P2d 1015 (1956).
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is also discernible in the cases dealing with riparian rights in which no
appropriations were involved. The 1955 case of Snively v. Jaberheld
that all riparians and their licensees on a given lake have a right in
common to the use of the lake, thus giving substantial protection to
riparian, and apparently public, rights of recreation on nonnavigable
lakes. We do not have any such recent cases on the extent of riparian
and public recreational rights on nonnavigable streams, although the
early case of Griffith v. Holman strictly limited those rights. If the
court continues to follow the trend toward protection of recreational
uses indicated by the lake cases it would seem unlikely that it would
-or should-today adhere to the rule of the Griffith case.

